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 ARTICLE  
 The structure of fundamental rights and 
the European Court of Human Rights 
 Janneke  Gerards * and  Hanneke  Senden ** 
 An important aspect of the structure of fundamental rights is the bifurcation between the 
deﬁ nition of scope and the review of justiﬁ cation. Although this bifurcation is of great 
importance both to the division of the burden of proof and to the use of such tools as the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, it appears that the European Court of Human 
Rights does not always take it seriously. The Court often fails to address issues of 
deﬁ nition or merges the two elements into a single test. This paper highlights some of the 
problematic consequences of the Court’s current approach; in the end, this approach may 
hamper the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights and limit the 
protection offered to individual citizens. A more structured approach toward the scope and 
deﬁ nition of Convention rights may help to solve or avoid these problems. 
 1.  Introduction 
 As a newly established, supranational court deciding on human rights in a 
highly diverse and ever-widening Council of Europe, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ﬁ nds itself in a difﬁ cult position. Over the last sixty 
years, the Court has had to create a set of argumentation techniques and a 
judicial discourse that would be acceptable to all the Council’s states parties 
and would be compatible with a variety of legal systems and legal traditions. It 
has had to navigate carefully between the aim of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) — the effective protection of fundamental rights — and 
the need to respect national traditions and sensitivities. It has had to thread its 
way, as well, between the need to protect individuals against fundamental 
rights violations and the need to provide sufﬁ cient clarity as to the general 
scope and meaning of the Convention. 
 In general, the ECtHR has performed admirably in steering a middle course 
among these conﬂ icting needs and obligations. 1 Nonetheless, the Court’s 
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 1  See generally Janneke Gerards,  Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights ,  in T HE 
L EGITIMACY OF H IGHEST C OURTS ’ R ULINGS . J UDICIAL D ELIBERATIONS AND B EYOND 407 (Nick Huls, Maurice 
Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2009). 
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approach to argumentation reveals shortcomings that might be considered 
harmful both to the protection of fundamental rights in national legal systems 
and the Convention system itself. In particular, the Court’s approach to the 
structure of fundamental rights is ambiguous and confusing. In many classic 
understandings of fundamental rights, a distinction is made between two dif-
ferent elements: the element of the deﬁ nition of the scope of fundamental rights, 
on the one hand, and the element of justiﬁ cation or limitation, on the other. 
This seemingly theoretical distinction, which we further explain and elaborate 
on in section 2 of this paper, has several signiﬁ cant consequences. For exam-
ple, if hate speech is deﬁ ned as a form of  “ expression ” that is protected by the 
freedom of expression, it clearly comes within the scope of article 10 of the 
European Convention. This means that restrictions of hate speech, such as 
imposing a penalty on someone for distributing racist ﬂ yers, must be justiﬁ ed 
by the government in accordance with the limitation clause of the second par-
agraph of article 10. As a consequence, the ECtHR is competent to examine the 
reasonableness of the national justiﬁ cation and to give a binding judgment on 
the matter. By contrast, if freedom of expression were deﬁ ned more narrowly, 
cases of hate speech might fall outside the scope of article 10. That would mean 
that there would be no need, under article 10 § 2, to justify a penalty imposed 
because of hate speech and that an individual found guilty of hate speech 
would have no standing in Strasbourg. 
 The conceptual distinction between scope and justiﬁ cation is thus of great 
importance to the application of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The deﬁ nition of the scope of fundamental rights determines whether a justiﬁ -
cation must be advanced and whether the Court is competent to examine the 
reasonableness of the justiﬁ cation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the bifurcation 
between deﬁ nition and justiﬁ cation is clearly reﬂ ected in many Convention 
provisions. Many, if not most, Convention articles contain two or more differ-
ent paragraphs, the ﬁ rst paragraph stating the right at issue and the second 
containing the possibilities for limitation or justiﬁ cation. Particularly well-
known in this regard are articles 8 through 11 of the Convention; however, 
examples may also be found in article 2 (right to life) and article 4 of Protocol 
No. 2 (freedom of movement). 
 It might be expected from this that the European Court would pay close 
attention to the distinction. Indeed, the Court usually seems to apply a bifur-
cated approach, often even using different headings to indicate the various 
stages of its review. 2 Nonetheless, it appears that the Court does not take the 
 2  Since its very early decisions, the Court has recognized the importance of the division between deﬁ -
nition of the scope of a right under the ﬁ rst paragraph of articles 8 through 11 and the examination 
of the justiﬁ cation under the second paragraph;  see, e.g., National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 
19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 37 – 42 (1975), in which it found that it did not have to examine a justiﬁ -
cation under the second paragraph as it did not ﬁ nd an interference with the right to trade union 
freedom in the case at hand;  see also , expressly, the well-known  Handyside case (Handyside v. United 
Kingdom 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 43 (1976):  “ The various measures challenged — the applicant’s 
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bifurcation as seriously as it should. In many cases it either ignores the ﬁ rst, 
deﬁ nitional stage (or conﬁ nes itself merely to noting the applicability of the 
Convention) 3 or merges the two stages of fundamental rights review into a 
 single test. 4 
 In this paper, we will highlight some of the problematic consequences of the 
ECtHR’s approach to the structure of fundamental rights. It is important to do 
so, since the way the Court deals with the structure of fundamental rights 
strongly inﬂ uences the interpretation and application of the Convention by 
national courts. Structural faults and deﬁ cits thus may be multiplied in national 
cases that never reach Strasbourg. In the end, this may hamper the effective-
ness of the Convention system and limit the protection offered to individual 
citizens. 
 To support this argument, we will ﬁ rst discuss a number of theoretical 
aspects of the distinction between deﬁ nition and application (section 2). In sec-
tion 3, we will provide an overview of the case law of the Court in which it 
either pays little or no attention to the scope of the right at stake or else merges 
the stages of deﬁ nition and justiﬁ cation into a single test. In section 4, we will 
argue that this case law has a number of problematic consequences as regards 
the clarity of the Court’s case law (4.2), the division of the burden of proof (4.3), 
and the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine (4.4). Finally, we will sub-
mit that a more structured approach toward the scope and deﬁ nition of 
Convention rights may help to avoid or solve these problems (section 5). 
 As a preliminary to this paper it is important to note that we will focus on 
Convention rights that are not absolute in character. Some of the rights con-
tained in the Convention, such as article 3 (the prohibition of torture) or article 
7 ( nulla poene sine lege priori ), are nonderogable or can be limited only in the 
rarest of circumstances. The need for the deﬁ nition of the scope of protection of 
such provisions is of great importance, since no justiﬁ cation or balancing oper-
ation is possible once an interference with these rights has been established. 
criminal conviction, the seizure and subsequent forfeiture and destruction of the matrix and of hun-
dreds of copies of the Schoolbook — were without any doubt, and the Government did not deny it, 
 ‘ interferences by public authority ’ in the exercise of his freedom of expression which is guaranteed by 
paragraph 1 of the text cited above. Such interferences entail a  ‘ violation ’ of article 10 if they do not 
fall within one of the exceptions provided for in paragraph 2, which is accordingly of decisive impor-
tance in this case. ” In later cases, it has stressed the importance of the bifurcation by using headings; 
it did this for the ﬁ rst time in the case of  Young, James, and Webster:  “ 1. The existence of an interference 
with an article 11 right ” and  “ 2. The existence of a justiﬁ cation for the interference found by the 
Court ” (Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)). 
 3  This is already visible in the Handyside case, in which the Court restricted its argumentation at 
the ﬁ rst stage of the review to noting that the  “ various measures challenged  . . . were, without any 
doubt,  . . .  ‘ interferences by public authority ’ in the exercise of his [the applicant’s] freedom of 
expression ” ( see supra note 2). 
 4  See infra section 3. 
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The debate surrounding nonderogable rights and the hidden possibilities for 
limitation of these rights is very different from the debate regarding the struc-
ture of judicial review of interferences with nonabsolute rights. This renders 
the case law about nonderogable rights less material from the perspective cho-
sen in this paper. For that reason, this case law will not be discussed. 
 2.  The structure of fundamental rights — Theoretical 
issues 
 2.1.  The need to distinguish different stages of review 
 According to many legal scholars and judges, it is important, almost self- 
evident to distinguish between at least two elements or stages of review in cases 
focused on derogable fundamental rights. 5 First, the body of facts presented by 
an individual applicant must establish that an interference with an expressly 
protected right has occurred. 6 A prima facie case of infringement of a funda-
mental right is established thereby. Such a prima facie case of infringement 
usually does not sufﬁ ce, by itself, to support the decision that the interference 
constitutes a breach or a violation of a fundamental right. This would be true 
only if fundamental rights were considered to be absolute in character, which 
means that they would provide full and unlimited protection against all gov-
ernment interference as soon as they apply. It is generally accepted, however, 
that limitations of fundamental rights can be justiﬁ ed by convincing and 
important general interests or by the need to protect a conﬂ icting individual 
 5  See, e.g., David L. Faigman,  Reconciling Individual Rights and Governmental Interests: Madisonian Prin-
ciples versus Supreme Court Practice , 78 V A . L. R EV . 1521, 1522 – 1523; G ERARD V AN DER S CHYFF , L IMITA-
TION OF R IGHTS : A S TUDY OF THE E UROPEAN C ONVENTION AND THE S OUTH A FRICAN B ILL OF R IGHTS 11 (2005); 
S TEFAN S OTTIAUX , T ERRORISM AND THE L IMITATION OF R IGHTS : T HE ECHR  AND THE US C ONSTITUTION 35 (2008). 
See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
§§ 3 – 5 (1979) (stating that the two separate stages of review  “ are elementary, standard propositions 
which should not need stating because they are such as everyone would assent to in principle ” ). 
 6  In this respect, it may be maintained that the ﬁ rst stage of fundamental review actually consists 
of two separate elements,  i.e., the deﬁ nition of the scope of the right and the establishment of a 
concrete interference with that right in the case under scrutiny ( see also V AN DER S CHYFF ,  supra note 
5, at 41). The European Court also tends to make this distinction in its case law, examining the 
issue of whether there has been an interference with the Convention on its own. There are some 
problems of conceptual confusion in this case law too, as is visible in the case of  Cha’are Shalom Ve 
Tsedek , in which the Court used elements of the application test (namely the question whether 
there was a  sufﬁ ciently serious interference, which was decided on basis of the availability of alter-
natives to the applicants) in deciding whether the claim attracted the protection of article 9 of the 
Convention (Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 78 – 84). The question 
of interference with the Convention certainly requires attention but lies outside the scope of this 
paper, which has as its main focus the issue of the deﬁ nition of the Convention’s scope in relation 
to the application of Convention rights. 
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right. 7 A deﬁ nitive conclusion about the alleged violation can be reached only 
when the soundness of the justiﬁ cation adduced by the government has been 
scrutinized. 
 Although this two-part structure of fundamental rights is widely recognized, 
its importance for judicial review is sometimes questioned. This is especially true 
with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights. 8 In his important 
book about the Convention, Steven Greer has stated that  “ the Court has the ulti-
mate constitutional responsibility for determining what each right means . . . . 
[W]hether this process is described as  ‘ deﬁ ning ’ vague rights more precisely, 
 ‘ determining their scope ’ , or  ‘ balancing ’ one right against the other, matters less 
than the recognition that there is no scope for genuine domestic discretion con-
cerning how the rights themselves should be understood. ” 9 In a similar fashion, 
Franz Matscher and George Letsas generally have classiﬁ ed such diverse argu-
mentative methods as teleological interpretation, margin of appreciation, and 
proportionality review as  “ methods of interpretation ” of the Convention. 10 If this 
perspective is taken, the distinction between deﬁ nition and application does not 
really matter, nor is there any need to distinguish between classic argumenta-
tion techniques concerning the deﬁ nition of rights (such as textual and teleologi-
cal interpretation) and techniques that are mainly used to examine the 
justiﬁ cation for an interference (such as proportionality review and the margin 
of appreciation doctrine). Interpretation of the Convention is thus regarded as a 
conglomerate of judicial decision making where only the ﬁ nal result counts. 11 
 7  Some rights, such as the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (article 3 
of the Convention) and the principle of  nulla crimen sine lege priori (article 7 of the Convention), are 
considered to be absolute. In those cases, no limitations are possible; as explained in section 1, 
however, these nonderogable rights will not be discussed in this paper. 
 8  Although, as has been mentioned above, the Court itself usually starts from the assumption that 
the bifurcation does matter. 
 9  S TEVEN G REER , T HE E UROPEAN C ONVENTION ON H UMAN R IGHTS : A CHIEVEMENTS , P ROBLEMS AND P ROSPECTS 212 
(2006). 
 10  See Franz Matscher,  Les contraintes de l’interpretation juridictionnelle — les méthodes d’interprétation de 
la Convention Européenne [Constraints on Judicial Interpretation — Methods of Judicial Interpretation] ,  in 
L’ INTERPRETATION DE LA CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME [T HE I NTERPRETATION OF THE E UROPEAN 
C ONVENTION ON H UMAN R IGHTS ] 15, 18 and 37 (Frédéric Sudre ed., 1998) and G EORGE L ETSAS , A T HEORY OF 
I NTERPRETATION OF THE E UROPEAN C ONVENTION ON H UMAN R IGHTS (2007);  see also Aaron A. Ostrovsky,  What’s 
So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core 
Human Rights within Cultural Diversity and Legitimises International Human Rights Tribunals , 1 H ANSE L. 
R EV . 47, 57 (2005) (regarding the margin of appreciation doctrine as an interpretative tool that 
 “ allows the Court to draw a line around core rights, ” thus not clearly distinguishing between deﬁ n-
ing and limiting fundamental rights). By contrast, G REER criticizes the Court for its unstructured ap-
proach and the indistinct way in which it uses  “ a dozen or so ” interpretative principles ( supra note 9, 
at 696). Although G REER does not (like L ETSAS and Matscher) make any clear distinction between 
principles and methods concerning the deﬁ nition of scope and principles and methods relating to the 
test of justiﬁ cation, he does seem to accept that a distinction between the two stages must be made. 
 11  Matscher,  supra note 11; L ETSAS ,  supra note 11. 
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 The doctrinal approach toward the European Convention taken by authors 
such as Steven Greer, George Letsas, and Franz Matscher may be contrasted 
with the classical constitutional rights doctrine that has developed in countries 
such as the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States. In the United States, 
for example, David Faigman has demonstrated that the distinction between 
the deﬁ nition of the scope of rights and the possibilities for justiﬁ cation is deeply 
embedded in the constitutional system, even though it is not always respected 
by the Supreme Court. 12 Similarly, the bifurcation is clearly visible in German 
constitutional doctrine, where German legal theorists such as Robert Alexy 
have argued that it is, structurally, an essential part of all fundamental consti-
tutional rights. 13 
 A number of reasons have been advanced for distinguishing between deﬁ ni-
tion of scope and examination of justiﬁ cation. Faigman has put particular 
weight on the respective values guiding the courts in the stages of deﬁ nition of 
scope and of justiﬁ cation. In his view, when  deﬁ ning fundamental rights, the 
guiding values should come from the constitution per se. 14 The value of consti-
tutional protection of fundamental rights is that these rights and liberties are 
placed beyond the reach of majority forces, such as the legislature. The consti-
tution operates as a bulwark against majority tyranny. 15 When deﬁ ning the 
scope of a fundamental right the courts, therefore, should be guided only by the 
text and aims of the constitution, not by general interests as deﬁ ned by the 
legislature. 16 By contrast, when applying fundamental rights to individual 
cases and scrutinizing the  justiﬁ cation advanced in defense of an interference, 
Faigman argues that the courts must be guided by values coming from the 
majoritarian forces. 17 The reason for this is that the  “ counter- majoritarian 
difficulty ” (that is, the constitutional problem created by a nonelected court 
being authorized to strike down or correct democratically legitimized meas-
ures) imparts a presumptive validity to state action. 18 Whereas the courts must 
place the constitution in the forefront when deﬁ ning individual rights, they have 
to step back when scrutinizing the limitation of these rights so as to respect the 
primacy of the legislature. 
 Alexy has grounded his argument for distinguishing between deﬁ nition and 
application in more structural considerations. In Alexy’s view, fundamental 
 12  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1522ff. 
 13  R OBERT A LEXY , A T HEORY OF C ONSTITUTIONAL R IGHTS (Julian Rivers, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002), 
at 84 – 86, 180, and 199. 
 14  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1529. 
 15  Id. at 1528. 
 16  Id . at 1529. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. at 1528. 
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rights provisions typically have a  “ double aspect, ” since they couple rules and 
principles. 19 The  “ rule ” is the actual right as protected by the fundamental 
rights provisions, such as  “ everyone has the right to freedom of expression. ” 
This formulation of the right would be a  “ complete rule ” if it were limitless or 
nonderogable, because it would then be applicable without any need for the 
right to be balanced against any other norm or interest. 20 Moreover, the right 
would then have a rule-like character since it would enable each case to be 
solved by a simple form of subsumption. 21 However, Alexy proceeds to show 
that almost no limitless fundamental rights exist in practice, and that express 
or implicit limitation clauses call, usually, for a balance to be struck between 
the fundamental right at stake and one or more competing general interests. 
To that extent fundamental rights typically have the character of principles. 
 In this argument, it is inadequate to conceive of constitutional rights norms 
purely as rules or purely as principles. 22 Because of the difference in character 
of both aspects of fundamental rights, Alexy submits that it is necessary to dis-
tinguish carefully between the rule-like element and the principle-like element. 
We may add to this that the two distinct stages of review call for different judi-
cial methods to be applied, precisely because of their difference in character. 
When examining whether a given set of facts comes within the scope of the 
freedom of expression, a court may apply the classic methods of interpretation 
of rules (such as textual and structural interpretation), while it must apply the 
typical methods of balancing in the context of scrutinizing the justiﬁ cation. 23 
For this reason, the distinction between scope and justiﬁ cation is of great 
importance. 
 2.2.  The importance of the deﬁ nitional stage—Wide or narrow 
deﬁ nition of fundamental rights? 
 Although the theoretical arguments discussed in section 2.1 seem to demon-
strate that there is good reason to take the distinction between scope and justi-
ﬁ cation seriously, something more may be said about the need for the deﬁ nition 
of rights. Even if it is agreed that it is necessary to distinguish carefully between 
deﬁ ning the terms of a fundamental right and examining the reasons advanced 
in justiﬁ cation of an interference with the right, an important question arises 
concerning how courts should proceed when deﬁ ning the scope of certain 
 19  A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 84 – 85. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id . 
 22  Id. at 85 – 86. 
 23  A LEXY himself argues that a wide conception of constitutional norms should be chosen,  “ in which 
everything which the relevant constitutional principle suggests should be protected falls within 
the scope of protection ” (A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 210). He leaves little room for  “ deﬁ nitional bal-
ancing ” or other ways to establish the scope and meaning of fundamental rights. 
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notions central to fundamental rights, such as  “ expression, ”  “ religion, ” or  “ pri-
vate life. ” After all, such concepts can be deﬁ ned either rather broadly (encom-
passing a range of individual interests that might vary from the right not to be 
subject to unannounced nighttime searches to the right to walk one’s dog on a 
nearby ﬁ eld) or rather narrowly (limiting the scope of the right to what is con-
sidered its  “ core ” ). 24 
 A variety of reasons have been adduced in support of a narrow deﬁ nition of 
fundamental rights. It has been argued, for example, that a broad interpreta-
tion of fundamental rights would disable the legislature in favor of the courts, 
which would be empowered, in many cases, to strike down unfavorable legis-
lation that might interfere with individual rights. 25 In addition, the warning 
has been issued that a wide-ranging interpretation of fundamental rights could 
result in a ﬂ ood of cases about fundamental rights and, thus, in an undesirable 
 “ fundamental rights-alisation ” and constitutionalization of society. 26 Such 
constitutionalization would not only be problematic from the perspective of 
judicial caseload but it could also have the effect of giving more importance 
and inﬂ uence to the courts. Especially when a wide scope given to rights could 
be combined with a broad interpretation of the limits of the right, it would be 
up to the courts to decide on the reasonableness of practically any action taken 
by the state. 27 The ensuing judicialization of the legal system might be consid-
ered a threat to classic balances of power. 
 The call for a narrow deﬁ nition of fundamental rights has taken on particu-
lar relevance in the context in which the ECtHR hands down its judgments. If 
the widest possible interpretation of fundamental rights were chosen by this 
Court, it would have to examine national justiﬁ cations and limitations in 
nearly any case brought before it. 28 This would not only be highly problematic 
because of the Court’s enormous caseload but it would also put great pressure 
on the Court’s already complex relationship with the national authorities. 
According to article 1 of the Convention, the latter have the primary responsi-
bility to protect and respect fundamental rights. 29 The Court is called on to 
 24  Cf. Mattias Kumm,  Who’s Afraid of the Total Constitution? ,  in A RGUING F UNDAMENTAL R IGHTS 113, 117 
(Agustín José Menéndez & Erik Oddvar Eriksen eds., 2005);  cf. also A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 201. 
 25  Cf. V AN DER S CHYFF ,  supra note 5, at 35 (with references);  cf. also A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 211. 
 26  Cf. A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 213. 
 27  See Kumm,  supra note 24, at 118. 
 28  It has been argued by A LEXY that it does not make a difference to the caseload of a court to use a 
narrow or broad deﬁ nition of fundamental rights since, in his view, a narrow deﬁ nition also neces-
sitates an examination of the justiﬁ cation (A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 213ff.). The only difference 
would be that the justiﬁ cation test is then applied at a different stage and would be somewhat ob-
scured. This is not entirely true, however, if a different approach is taken toward the ways in which 
a narrow deﬁ nition of fundamental rights can be given, as we propose to do. We will further 
explain this point below. 
 29  See , more speciﬁ cally,  infra sections 4.1 and 4.4 (with references). 
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intervene only when it is clear that the national authorities have failed to live 
up to their responsibilities and have shown an obvious lack of respect for fun-
damental rights. As a result of the speciﬁ c supranational situation, the Court 
has a doubly complicated constitutional position. 30 Just as national (constitu-
tional) courts do, it must deal with the countermajoritarian difﬁ culty, which 
means that it must respect the democratic legitimacy of national legislative 
measures. In addition, it owes respect to the sovereignty of nation-states 31 — a 
respect more easily accorded if a narrow deﬁ nition of fundamental rights is 
chosen. A narrow deﬁ nition also means that national governments will not be 
asked to defend decisions and legislative acts that have only a tangential impact 
on the rights protected by the Convention. In this way, the Court need consider 
itself competent only to decide issues that truly concern fundamental rights 
and over which the exercise of supranational power would be appropriate. 
 Although a narrow deﬁ nition of fundamental rights seems desirable for 
these reasons, often it has been stressed, as well, that a broad deﬁ nition would 
be preferable. Aside from the general argument that the desire for effective pro-
tection of fundamental rights warrants a generous deﬁ nition of such rights, 32 
the argument has been made that a narrow deﬁ nition could cause major prob-
lems with regard to the structural and conceptual distinction between scope 
and justiﬁ cation. A narrow deﬁ nition of the scope of fundamental rights might 
too easily invite a balancing of interests and of the elements of application, all 
of which could be introduced in the ﬁ rst, deﬁ nitional stage of review. 33 
 This risk has been stressed, in particular, by Alexy, who has supported the 
argument by the example of an artist who wants to paint on a busy intersec-
tion. 34 A broad reading of the right to freedom of artistic expression clearly sug-
gests that the artist’s right is protected by the relevant provision. It is hardly to 
be denied, after all, that painting (even if it is done on a busy intersection) is an 
artistic activity. By contrast, a narrow interpretation of the freedom of expres-
sion could mean that only those forms of artistic expression are covered that do 
not cause a threat to trafﬁ c. The deﬁ nition of the right is then made conditional 
on the governmental interest that is served by limiting the right to freedom of 
expression (that is, in the interest of guaranteeing trafﬁ c safety), which means 
 30  Cf. James A. Sweeney,  Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era , 54 I NT ’ L & C OMP . L.Q. 459, 472 (2005). 
 31  See, for a strong normative underpinning of this argument, J. H. H. W EILER , T HE C ONSTITUTION OF 
E UROPE (1999), at 104 – 107. 
 32  V AN DER S CHYFF  supra note 5, at 32. 
 33  V AN DER S CHYFF ,  supra note 5, at 33. See, in particular, with respect to the doctrine of positive 
obligations as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights, also Pieter Van Dijk,  ‘ Positive 
Obligations ’ Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the States Still the  ‘ Masters ’ of 
the Convention? in T HE R OLE OF THE N ATION -S TATE IN THE 21 ST C ENTURY 17, 25 (Monique Castermans-
Holleman, Fried van Hoof & Jacqueline Smith eds., 1998). 
 34  A LEXY  supra note 13, at 204. 
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that the question of limitation or justiﬁ cation is made part of the determination 
of the scope of the right. 35 Evidently, such an approach does not do justice to 
the important differences between deﬁ nition and application or limitation that 
have been explained above. 36 For that reason, Alexy has rejected the narrow 
approach in favor of giving the widest possible scope to fundamental rights. 37 
 It must be stressed, however, that the need to distinguish between scope and 
justiﬁ cation does not demand the widest possible deﬁ nitions of fundamental 
rights, nor does a narrow deﬁ nition of fundamental rights necessitate the intro-
duction of elements of justiﬁ cation at the stage of deﬁ nition. It is possible to use 
the classic methods of constitutional interpretation (textual, historical, teleo-
logical or purposive, structural or systematic) to exclude certain claims from 
the scope of protection of fundamental rights without resorting to balancing or 
without referring to speciﬁ c governmental interests. 38 It can be reasoned, for 
example, on the basis of teleological arguments, that pure hate speech has 
nothing to do with the kind of rights protected by the ECHR and does not ﬁ t in 
with the general aims of the Convention. No actual balancing exercise is 
required if notions such as  “ expression ” or  “ private life ” are deﬁ ned with refer-
ence to the text of the Convention or with reference to its underlying principles 
and guiding values. After all, no concrete juxtaposition of individual interests 
against public or general interests is apparent if it is stated that, in light of the 
underlying goals of the Convention, hate speech cannot be regarded as pro-
tected speech under the Convention. 39 This is different from the example of the 
 35  Id . at 205. 
 36  Id. at 213. 
 37  Meaning that  “ everything which the relevant constitutional principle suggests that should be 
protected falls within the scope of protection ” (A LEXY ,  supra note 13, at 210). 
 38  Cf. S OTTIAUX ,  supra note 5, at 36;  see also Aharon Barak,  Constitutional Interpretation ,  in 
L’ INTERPRETATION CONSTITUTIONELLE 91, 93ff. (Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien ed., 2005);  cf. also , speciﬁ -
cally in relation to the ECtHR, François Ost,  The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court 
of Human Rights ,  in T HE E UROPEAN C ONVENTION FOR THE P ROTECTION OF H UMAN R IGHTS 283, 288ff. (Mireille 
Delmas-Marty ed. (1992). Ost also makes clear that the ECtHR, in practice, indeed makes use of such 
methods in determining the meaning of the terms contained in the Convention ( id. at 293ff.). 
 39  Of course, it may be argued that even in this case some kind of balancing is visible, since each de-
termination of scope requires a choice to be made, and each choice presupposes a balance to be struck 
between a variety of interests. In this argument, deﬁ nition of fundamental rights is never possible 
without balancing — even an entirely text-based limitation of the scope of rights is then the result of a 
choice between different possible interpretations. Taken to its extreme, the argument that elements 
of balancing should not be introduced in the stage of deﬁ ning the scope of a right is then untenable, 
since it would imply that fundamental rights cover an unlimited number of individual interests —
 after all, any restriction of scope would imply a certain choice or limitation. The result would be that 
the stage of deﬁ nition would become factually meaningless and the competence of the ECtHR to de-
cide about fundamental rights would become virtually inﬁ nite ( cf . the dissenting opinion of former 
Judge Fitzmaurice in the  Marckx case, who stated that  “ within certain limits almost anything can 
colourably be presented as connected with or related to some other given thing, or as belonging to the 
same sphere of ideas ” (Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 5 (1979)). 
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artist painting on a busy road junction, where such a juxtaposition is visible 
indeed, albeit rather covertly. The painter’s activity is considered not to consti-
tute a form of artistic expression  because of the need to protect trafﬁ c safety , not 
because of limitations inherent in the text of the Convention, its drafting his-
tory, or its underlying aims. This means that a clear and concrete public inter-
est is covertly balanced against the freedom of expression; such balancing is a 
judicial activity that is only in its proper place in the second stage of the review. 
Judicial determination of scope as a matter of interpretation by means of classic 
canons of interpretation can thus be distinguished from application or exami-
nation of justiﬁ cation. This means that it is not necessary to resort to the widest 
possible interpretation of fundamental rights in order to safeguard structurally 
correct judicial review. 
 2.3.  Conclusion 
 We have explained, in this section, that it is desirable for theoretical reasons 
that the ECtHR make an effort to distinguish carefully between the deﬁ nition of 
the scope of rights and the examination of the justiﬁ cation for an interference 
with those rights. However, this does not automatically mean that the widest 
deﬁ nition of rights should be given. The stage of the deﬁ nition of scope would 
become rather empty if all individual interests, however far removed from the 
core of the right in question, were covered by the Convention. Instead, the 
determination of the scope of fundamental rights must be taken seriously so as 
to avoid having the Court become overburdened with cases that have little to 
do with fundamental rights. The challenge for the Court is to pay sufﬁ cient 
attention to the deﬁ nition of the rights contained in the Convention, without 
confusing elements of  “ pure ” deﬁ nition and elements of application (such as 
balancing of interests). In our view, the Court, thus far, has not truly met this 
challenge, as we will endeavor to show in the next section. 
 3.  The structure of fundamental rights and the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law 
 3.1.  Introduction 
 Now that the theoretical perspective has been outlined, it is important to see where 
the Court’s approach presently falls short. There are different types of cases in 
which it can be seen that the Court does not take the bifurcation (between scope 
and justiﬁ cation) particularly seriously. The purpose of this section is to discuss 
some examples that represent the Court’s various approaches. Three types of cases 
will be discussed. First, there is a range of cases in which the Court does not address 
or ignores the ﬁ rst, deﬁ nitional stage. In the second sort of cases the Court does pay 
some attention to the stage of deﬁ nition, though it does so in such a summary way 
that it can hardly be considered a proper discussion of the deﬁ nition of the right in 
question. The ﬁ nal type of case is one where the Court confuses or merges the ﬁ rst 
and second stage, taking both stages together in a single test. 
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 3.2.  Cases in which the ECtHR does not address the issue of deﬁ nition 
of rights 
 In the ﬁ rst set of cases, the Court acknowledges that there is an issue in the deﬁ -
nitional stage that should be addressed; however, the Court, in the end, fails or 
refuses to go into the matter. The case of  Molka v. Poland 40 provides an illustra-
tion of this approach. In this case, the Court paved the way for an answer to the 
question whether a positive obligation existed, though it explicitly refused to 
answer that question. The litigation concerned a man in a wheelchair who 
had been unable to vote, since the polling station was not accessible to the disa-
bled. The question was whether the failure to provide appropriate access to the 
polling station constituted a breach of article 8 of the Convention. After reiter-
ating some precedents the Court continued as follows: 
 Having regard to the above considerations, the Court does not rule out 
the possibility that, in circumstances such as those in the present case, a 
sufﬁ cient link would exist to attract the protection of Article 8. However, 
the Court does not ﬁ nd it necessary ﬁ nally to determine the applicability 
of the Article in the present case since, for the reasons which follow, the 
application is in any event inadmissible on other grounds. 41 
The Court thus recalled existing principles developed in previous cases, though 
it failed to apply them to the new situation presented by the applicant. 
The vague indication that the Court would not rule out the possibility that the 
applicant’s situation falls within the scope of article 8 is not helpful in provid-
ing clarity. The individual case might be solved; nonetheless, the Court’s deci-
sion leaves the reader, at least, with the rather unsatisfactory feeling that no 
clear answer has been given to the question whether the applicant had a right 
protected under article 8. 
 A somewhat similar approach has been adopted by the Court in  Maurice 
v. France . 42 This case concerned a matter of wrongful birth. The applicants 
claimed that the state did not protect, sufﬁ ciently, the interests of the family; it 
failed, they asserted, to provide them with a remedy and compensation ena-
bling them to cope with the special burden of a child’s disability. After reiterat-
ing some very general considerations on the concept of positive obligations, 
the margin of appreciation, and the subsidiary position of the Court, the Court 
acknowledged that it had to address the applicability of article 8. Subsequently, 
however, the Court refused to answer that question and concluded:  “ [T]he 
Court does not consider it necessary in the present case to determine that issue 
since, even supposing that Article 8 may be considered applicable, it considers 
 40  Mólka v. Poland ( dec. ), 11 April 2006, appl. no. 56550/00,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 41  Id. 
 42  Maurice v. France ( Grand Chamber ), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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that the situation complained of by the applicants did not constitute a breach 
of that provision. ” 43 
 Without answering the question of applicability of article 8, the Court thus 
proceeded on an assumption of applicability. It is unclear how the Grand 
Chamber can decide, convincingly, whether the limitation of a certain 
Convention right was legitimate when the scope of the Convention right has 
not been determined at all. Merely supposing or assuming that an article is 
applicable cannot take the place of paying proper attention to the deﬁ nition 
stage; to proceed so is far too indeﬁ nite. The scope of a right provides an indica-
tion of the type of limitations that might be allowed. Moreover, it is necessary 
to determine the obligations for the respondent state before one can actually 
decide whether they have been violated. Thus, it would have been necessary to 
discuss the scope of a provision in order to provide, in this particular situation, 
a convincing and coherent answer to the problem posed by the case at hand. 
 Within this ﬁ rst set of cases, in which the Court either does not address or 
ignores the ﬁ rst stage, a closely related range of cases can be distinguished, 
where a similar approach has been taken by the Court. In these cases, the Court 
tends to indicate that the applicability of a Convention right is not clear-cut; in 
other words, it is unclear whether the situation comes within the scope of the 
provision invoked. In these cases, the Court concludes, however, that the appli-
cability has not been disputed, and, therefore, it is not necessary to discuss the 
scope of the right in question. An example of this type of case is presented by  Elli 
Poluhas Dödsbo v. Sweden. 44 The applicant in this case claimed that the refusal of 
the Swedish authorities to permit her to move the remains of her deceased hus-
band to a family grave resulted in a breach of article 8. The Court stated that 
not every involvement with burials constituted an interference with article 8, 
yet it continued, surprisingly, with the following considerations: 
 In the present case, the Government have not disputed that the refusal 
to allow the removal of the urn involved an interference with the appli-
cant’s private life. The Court does not consider it necessary to determine 
whether such a removal involves the notions  “ family life ” or  “ private 
life ” cited in Article 8 of the Convention, but will proceed on the assump-
tion that there has been an interference, within the meaning of Article 8 
§ 1 of the Convention. 45 
It seems startling that the Court openly acknowledges that a case may raise 
questions on the scope of article 8, but, given the positions of the parties, refuses 
 43  Id. § 120. A similar approach has been adopted by the Court in Sentges v. Netherlands (dec.), 8 July 
2003, app. no. 27677/02,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng ; Draon v. France ( Grand Chamber ), 6 October 
2005, app. no. 1513/03,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng ; Wendenburg v. Germany ( dec. ), 2003-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R.; Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 22 May 2008, app. no. 65755/01,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 44  Elli Poluhas Dödsbo v. Sweden, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 45  Id. § 24. 
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to answer that question. In this type of case, just as in the cases discussed above, 
the Court ﬁ nally decides the case purely on the assumption that article 8 is 
applicable. 
 In the case of  Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom , 46 concerning the 
conviction of three men for consensual homosexual sadomasochistic activi-
ties, the Court even more explicitly expressed its doubts as to whether the situ-
ation was covered by the scope of article 8: 
 The Court observes that not every sexual activity carried out behind 
closed doors necessarily falls within the scope of Article 8 . . . . [I]t may 
thus be open to question whether the sexual activities of the applicants 
fell entirely within the notion of  “ private life ” in the particular circum-
stances of the case. 
 However, since this point has not been disputed by those appearing 
before it, the Court sees no reason to examine it of its own motion in 
the present case. Assuming, therefore, that the prosecution and con-
viction of the applicants amounted to an interference with their private 
life, the question arises whether such an interference was  “ necessary 
in a democratic society ” within the meaning of the second paragraph 
of Article 8. 47 
The Court thus openly doubted whether the activity complained of fell within 
the scope of article 8, yet it did not address this issue in any more detail because 
the government did not raise the matter. A particularly problematic aspect of 
this approach is related to the fact that the deﬁ nition of a Convention article 
determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide the case. 48 For that 
reason, this type of question should not be left solely to the position and argu-
ments of the parties. Important procedural aspects should be addressed by the 
Court  ex ofﬁ cio , which means that it should always address the question of 
whether article 8 is applicable to this type of situation in order to determine its 
own competence to deal with the case. This is even more relevant when the 
Court expressly doubts whether a certain case falls within the scope of one of 
the Convention rights. 
 3.3.  Cases in which the ECtHR does not explain why the Convention is 
applicable 
 The second set of cases is related to the type just described. In these cases, the 
Court does accept that the case falls within the scope of the Convention article, 
but it fails to explain why. The examples that will be discussed hereinafter all 
 46  Laskey Jaggard and Brown v. United Kingdom, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 47  Id. § 36. 
 48  See section 1. 
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involve article 10, the freedom of expression. This is the main area where the 
Court has adopted this approach, probably due to the very broad scope of the 
term  “ freedom of expression. ” Even if a term has a broad scope, the Court 
should still explain why a case falls within it. If the Court consistently fails to 
answer that question, a notion such as freedom of expression becomes void of 
any substance, and it makes it more difﬁ cult in cases of doubt to determine 
whether a certain situation is covered by this notion. The following examples 
illustrate the Court’s approach and demonstrate that some substantial expla-
nation and interpretation by the Court can be helpful in understanding the 
scope of article 10 of the Convention. 
 In the case of  Vajnai v. Hungary , 49 the applicant had worn a red star on his 
jacket during a demonstration. He was convicted for wearing this button, and 
a relatively light criminal sanction was imposed. In its judgment, the Court 
immediately jumped to examine the necessity for the interference by the gov-
ernment, thereby implying that wearing a certain button automatically 
engages protection under the freedom of expression. Precisely why wearing a 
button, or other forms of  “ symbolic speech, ” constitute a protected form of 
expression, therefore, remains unclear — the Court did not address that ques-
tion at all. 
 A similar approach is seen in the case of  Vereinigung Bildender Künstler 
v. Austria. 50 At issue was the exhibition of an obscene painting in which, among 
others, a politician was visibly depicted. Without addressing the question 
whether all forms of artistic expression or satire come within the scope of article 
10, the Court considered whether the interference was legitimate. According to 
the dissenting opinion of Judge Loukis Loucaides, it would have been at least 
appropriate for the Court to discuss this aspect of the case. While Judge Loucaides 
somewhat confused the ﬁ rst and second stage as well (he did not really make a 
distinction between deﬁ ning the scope of article 10 and its application to the 
facts of the case), he clearly disputed the assumption by the Court that every 
painting constitutes a protected form of artistic expression. He revealed, thereby, 
the need for the Court to have dealt with this aspect of the case. It would have 
been enlightening if the ECtHR had used the opportunity to justify the implicit 
conclusion in both cases that the situations were covered by article 10. 
 The case of  Perrin v. United Kingdom 51 dealt with the conviction of the appli-
cant for obscene publications on a Web site. By referring to a single precedent, 
that is, the case of  Müller v. Switzerland, 52 the Court determined that the convic-
tion constituted an interference with article 10. This case presents a proper 
 49  Vajnai v. Hungary, 8 July 2008, app. no. 33629/06,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 50  Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, 25 January 2007, app. no. 68354/01,  http :// www .
 echr . coe . int / eng . 
 51  Perrin v. United Kingdom ( dec. ), 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 52  Müller v. Switzerland, 5 November 2002, app. no. 41202/98,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
634 I•CON October 2009 Vol. 7: 619 
example of the dangers of brief references to precedents without any further 
explanation. First of all, the reference was incorrect, since the case mentioned 
concerned a complaint under article 6 of the Convention. The Court clearly 
intended to refer to a different case with a similar name, namely,  Müller et al. v. 
Switzerland . 53 Furthermore, the situations differ in important aspects, most sig-
niﬁ cantly, with regard to the type of expression.  Müller et al. dealt with obscene 
paintings, that is, a form of artistic expression, while in  Perrin the expression at 
issue consisted of obscene publications on a Web site without any claim to 
artistic elements. 54 For the development of the interpretation of the right to 
freedom of expression, it would be informative if the Court indicated on the 
basis of which element it considered the precedent applicable. That way, the 
meaning of freedom of expression would become clearer by explaining what 
the decisive elements are for the Court in considering article 10 applicable in a 
certain case. The Court, however, hardly paid attention to the applicability 
phase and simply invoked  Müller et al. to justify the applicability of article 10. 
 It should be clear, by now, in this second type of case, that the Court fails to 
provide a sufﬁ cient explanation as to why the situation at hand falls within the 
scope of the right in question. In some cases, this determination occurs by sim-
ply omitting the deﬁ nition stage; in others, it is effected by such cursory reason-
ing that, in effect, the stage of deﬁ nition seems to have been ignored to nearly 
the same extent as in the ﬁ rst type of case. 
 3.4.  Cases in which the ECtHR merges the ﬁ rst and second stages of 
fundamental rights review 
 The third and ﬁ nal type of case is one in which the Court confuses or merges 
the ﬁ rst and second stages. These are mainly cases on positive obligations, such 
as  Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom 55 and  Hatton v. United Kingdom. 56 The 
case of  Christine Goodwin marked the end of a line of cases in which, for over a 
decade, transsexuals had tried to obtain the right to legal recognition of their 
change of gender. 57 In all of these cases, the applicants claimed that the author-
ities failed to respect their private life by not allowing their gender change to be 
implemented in the register of births, which meant that, for legal purposes, 
they retained the gender they had had before the operation. 
 53  Müller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). 
 54  The Court intended to refer to a paragraph that does not deal with the type of expression, but 
only to a paragraph stating that the imposition of a ﬁ ne can constitute interference with article 10 
and that such has to be justiﬁ ed in accordance with article 10 § 2.  Id. § 28. 
 55  Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom ( Grand Chamber ), 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 56  Hatton v. United Kingdom ( Grand Chamber ), 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 57  See Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 186 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); B v. France, 232-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Shefﬁ eld & Horsham 
v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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 The question in these cases, basically, was whether the time was ripe to 
impose a positive obligation on states to ensure legal recognition of gender 
change. In trying to answer that question, the Court in  Christine Goodwin mixed 
the discussion of the meaning and essence of article 8 — elements typical of the 
ﬁ rst, deﬁ nitional stage — with references to typical elements of the second stage, 
namely, the margin of appreciation and the fair balance test. The Grand 
Chamber concluded that there was no longer a fair balance between the indi-
vidual interest in having the gender change legally recognized and the public 
interest in maintaining the current system. Therefore, the matter no longer fell 
within the margin of appreciation of the states. What the Court seems to have 
done in this case is to incorporate a balancing exercise into the deﬁ nition of the 
scope of article 8 in relation to transsexuals. The Court deﬁ ned the positive 
obligation under article 8 so as to ensure legal recognition of gender change by 
 “ weighing ” the public hardship against the individual hardship. This weighing 
of interests is an exercise that is characteristic of the second phase, in which the 
Court tries to establish whether a certain interference is necessary in a demo-
cratic society. 58 From a theoretical perspective, however, it is strange to con-
clude that the  existence of a fundamental right depends on public interests — such 
interests are only relevant within the context of the justiﬁ cation of a limitation 
of fundamental rights. 59 
 This confusing approach was also adopted in  Hatton v. United Kingdom . 60 In 
this case, the applicants complained about sleep disturbance as a result of night 
ﬂ ights at Heathrow Airport. In the applicants ’ view the national authorities 
were under a positive obligation to ensure that their rights under article 8 
would not be violated. The Grand Chamber acknowledged that there is no 
explicit right to a clean and quiet environment in article 8 but held that, in case 
of aircraft noise, an issue may arise under article 8. 61 Without answering the 
question whether article 8 was applicable to the case at hand, the Court recalled 
its subsidiary position and claimed that the state enjoyed a wide margin of 
appreciation in these cases. 62 It also emphasized that it had to assess the policy 
decisions by the government: 
 The Court considers that in a case such as the present one, involving 
state decisions affecting environmental issues, there are two aspects to 
the inquiry which may be carried out by the Court. First, the Court may 
 58  See ,  e.g. , Dickson v. United Kingdom, 4 December 2007, appl. no. 44362/04,  http :// www . echr .
 coe . int / eng . 
 59  See Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1523. 
 60  Hatton v. United Kingdom ( Grand Chamber ), 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.  Cf. also Giacomelli v. Italy, 
2 November 2006, app. no. 59909/00,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng ; Fadeyeva v. Russia, 2005-
IV Eur. CT. H.R.; Moreno Gomez v. Spain, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 61  Hatton v. United Kingdom ( Grand Chamber ), 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 96. 
 62  Id. §§ 97 – 100. 
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assess the substantive merits of the government’s decision, to ensure that 
it is compatible with Article 8. Secondly, it may scrutinise the decision-
making process to ensure that due weight has been accorded to the in-
terests of the individual. 
 In relation to the substantive aspect, the Court has held that the State 
must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation. 63 
As these considerations show, the Court in this case did not emphasize that 
it needed, ﬁ rst, to consider the applicability of article 8. Leaving that question 
unanswered, it only discussed whether article 8 had been violated and focused 
on achieving a fair balance between the governmental policy decisions and the 
individual interest. The conclusions are limited to this speciﬁ c case, since the 
Court conﬁ ned itself to the particular circumstances of the case and did not 
address the more abstract question of whether a right to a clean and quiet envi-
ronment could be read into article 8. Thus the judgment does little to clarify the 
proper interpretation of article 8. 64 
 3.5.  Conclusion 
 It has become clear, by now, that the Court in its adjudicative approach to fun-
damental rights cases does not always pay attention to the bifurcation between 
the deﬁ nition of scope and the examination of justiﬁ cation. In the ﬁ rst and sec-
ond type of cases, the problem is that the Court does not address the deﬁ nition 
stage properly. In these cases it tries to answer the question whether a limita-
tion to a Convention right is justiﬁ ed without adequately deﬁ ning the right. In 
the third type of cases, the Court determines the scope of the Convention right 
by including public interests and other elements typical of the application 
stage. This case-based approach thus puts a strong emphasis on the so-called 
second stage and, thereby, on the speciﬁ cs of individual cases. 
 As examples from its case law have shown, the Court’s approach differs 
from the theoretical approach discussed in section 2. Does this give rise to neg-
ative consequences or speciﬁ c problems? The following section will address this 
question. 
 4.  Problematic consequences of the Strasbourg Court’s 
approach 
 4.1.  Introduction 
 The Strasbourg Court is a special court in many respects. In principle, and from 
a purely legal perspective, the Court must be regarded as a supranational court. 
The legal status of the Convention in each of the states parties depends on their 
 63  Id. §§ 99 – 100. 
 64  Case comment by Heleen Janssen published in E UROPEAN H UMAN R IGHTS C ASES 2003, no. 71. 
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respective constitutional systems and legislative choices. 65 In addition, even 
though states parties have recognized the Court’s power to give binding judg-
ments on individual complaints or interstate applications, each judgment is 
legally binding only for the state named in the case. 66 Although there is some 
legal debate regarding the  erga omnes effect, the actual legal effect of Strasbourg 
case law is limited to the concrete circumstances of each case. 67 
 In practice, however, the status of the Court’s case law reaches far beyond 
the individual case decided. The Court has, by now, created an impressive body 
of case law, in which the rights contained in the Convention are interpreted 
and applied in an authoritative manner and which are regarded, generally, as 
authoritative. 68 Several scholars have even argued that the Court may now be 
characterized as a constitutional or, at least, a semiconstitutional court. 69 This 
classiﬁ cation is of great importance. The characterization of a supranational 
court as a constitutional court has an immediate, complicating effect on the 
dialogue with national constitutional courts. 70 The  “ new ” constitutional court 
may be regarded as a rival court, and the natural reaction of the national con-
stitutional court may be to resist any disputable judgments the newcomer 
hands down. 71 In addition, the Court is not organically embedded in national 
constitutional systems. Rather, it has been imposed upon states parties as an 
alien body that may be difﬁ cult to incorporate into existing legal structures and 
traditions. It is, therefore, not surprising when national legal systems have dif-
ﬁ culties coping with judgments handed down by the Court. 
 In this context, the Court may be able to maintain its important supervisory 
position only if the national courts continue to accept its judgments as authori-
tative explanations of the Convention. 72 For that reason, the Court will have to 
 65  Cf. Georg Ress,  The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Domestic Legal Order 40 T EX . I NT ’ L L.J. 359, 374 (2004 – 2005). 
 66  See article 46 ECHR. 
 67  If a state refuses to accept a judgment or interpretation given in a case to which it was not a party, 
there are no means to force the state to accept it. The only way is for an individual citizen to lodge an 
application regarding the same matter, thus triggering the Court to hand down a judgment that is 
binding for the state in question. On the incorporation of interpretations of the ECtHR and the  erga 
omnes effect of the Court’s interpretations, see Sa š a Beljin, Bundesverfassungsgericht  on the Status of 
the European Convention of Human Rights and ECHR Decisions in the German Legal Order; Decision of 14 
October 2004 , 1 E UR . C ONST . L. R EV . 553, 558 – 559 (2005);  see also Ress,  supra note 65, p. 374. 
 68  Cf. Ost,  supra note 38, at 284. 
 69  Cf. Luzius Wildhaber,  A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights? , 23 H UM . 
R TS . L. J. 161 (2002); G REER ,  supra note 9, at 172 – 173; Steven Greer,  What’s Wrong with the 
 European Convention on Human Rights? , 30  Hum. Rts. Q. 680, 684 – 685 (2008). 
 70  M ONICA C LAES , T HE N ATIONAL C OURTS ’ M ANDATE IN THE E UROPEAN C ONSTITUTION (2006), 401. 
 71  Id . 
 72  Cf. Lawrence R. Helfer,  Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights , 26 
C ORNELL I NT . L.J. 133, 137 (1993). 
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hand down clear judgments that are understandable for the national authori-
ties and provide convincing interpretations of the text of the Convention. 73 
This is true not only with regard to the application of fundamental rights in 
individual cases but also in connection with the development and use of argu-
mentation strategies and procedural methods. If insufﬁ cient guidance is given 
in this respect, the states may be inclined to follow their own paths. 74 In the end 
this may harm the supervisory and constitutional position of the Court, and it 
may hamper the effective and uniform protection of the rights contained in the 
Convention. 
 73  Cf. Greer,  supra note 69, at 686. 
 74  This risk is not entirely theoretical, as is clear from a judgment rendered by the German Consti-
tutional Court in 2004, in which it stressed that it considers the German Basic Law to be of higher 
order than the ECHR, which means that in situations of real conﬂ ict between a Strasbourg inter-
pretation of the Convention and one of the rights guaranteed by the Basic Law, the Basic Law will 
prevail (Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court], Oct 14, 2004, docket 
number 2 BvR 1481/04,  available at  http :// www . bundesverfassungsgericht . de , in particular at 
para. 35). German scholars have commented that this judgment may not be as revolutionary as it 
seems. Schaffarzik has stressed, for example, that conﬂ icts between the interpretation by the 
ECtHR and the national law will be rare, and that, moreover, article 53 of the Convention leaves 
sufﬁ cient scope for  “ a higher level of protection ” of fundamental rights on the national level 
(B. Schaffarzik,  Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfassungsgerichts , D IE Ö FFENTLI-
CHE V ERWALTUNG 860, 863 (2005)). Since the Constitutional Court decided that deviations from the 
ECtHR’s case law would only be permissible if such would be necessary to protect constitutional 
rights in Germany, there would be no real conﬂ ict between the Convention and the national law 
( id. , at 863). Dörr has argued that the issue of a different national interpretation or application will, 
in fact, only occur if the facts of the case have changed (O. Dörr,  Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen 
nationalen und europäischen Verfassungsgerichten , D EUTSCHES V ERWALTUNGSBLATT 1088, 1097 (2006)). 
Furthermore, the president of the German Constitutional Court, Hans-Jürgen Papier, has stated 
that the judgment has resulted in  “ a considerable increased effect of the Convention as compared 
with previous practice, ” rather than the opposite (Hans-Jürgen Papier,  Execution and Effects of the 
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the Perspective of German National Courts , 27 
H UMAN R TS . L.J. 1, 2 (2006);  cf. also Dörr,  supra , at 1092). Such arguments notwithstanding, it may 
be remarked that the result of the judgment, still, is that real interpretive clashes between the 
 German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR will not be solved in favor of the supranational court, but 
in favor of the (lower) national court. As Papier puts it:  “ . . . the Basic Law  . . . has theoretically the 
ﬁ nal say ” (Papier,  supra at 2;  see also Matthias Hartwig,  Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal 
Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights , 6 G ERMAN L.J. 869, 875 (2005)). 
For this reason and to this extent, the judgment discloses potential rivalry between the two highest 
courts. This is important, since the German decision appears to have raised the question in other 
states whether the decisions of the Court should always be implemented.  See  ‘ Das tut mir weh ’ , in-
terview with the president of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber ,  in D ER S PIEGEL , 15 November 2004, at 52 
(disclosing that Turkey and Poland have actually approached the ECtHR with this question). It is 
also important to note that the ECHR, different from EC law, does not have direct effect in the states 
parties.  See also Ress,  supra note 65, at 376 (mentioning that the Austrian Constitutional Court 
has stated that  “ there is still a difference between the Convention as a part of the constitution and 
the Convention as an international treaty interpreted by the ECtHR. Within the domestic legal 
order, the Convention is only one element in the mosaic of different constitutional provisions and 
its interpretation in that context may differ considerably from an interpretation based on the Con-
vention alone ” ). The superior status of the judgments of the ECtHR is far from ﬁ rmly established. 
639Gerards and Senden  |  The structure of fundamental rights 
 In our view, the approach taken by the Court with respect to the bifurcation 
between the deﬁ nition of scope and the examination of the justiﬁ cation for an 
interference falls short of the dual need to provide guidance and to interpret the 
Convention in an authoritative manner. In this section, we will elaborate on 
this statement by discussing three problematic consequences of the Court’s 
approach. First, we will argue that, on a substantive level, the case-based 
approach of the Court and the lack of attention it pays to the deﬁ nition of fun-
damental rights is undesirable, because it allows the Court to hide behind the 
speciﬁ c circumstances of the case and to avoid having to make structural deci-
sions on the scope of a Convention right (section 4.2). Second, we submit that 
the confusion of the two stages of review creates uncertainty regarding the 
allocation of the burden of proof, both at the level of the Strasbourg Court and 
at the national level (section 4.3). Third, and ﬁ nally, we ﬁ nd that the lack of 
attention to the bifurcation between scope and justiﬁ cation causes problems in 
connection with the margin of appreciation doctrine (section 4.4). 
 4.2.  Consequences for the scope of fundamental rights 
 As seen in section 3, the ECtHR places much emphasis on the second applica-
tion-and-justiﬁ cation stage, much less on the deﬁ nition stage. The heavy reli-
ance on justiﬁ cation results in a case-based approach in which the bifurcation 
is not always properly respected. 75 This can affect the soundness of the Court’s 
reasoning, which has been shown by the examples discussed in section 3. This 
section will focus on the problematic consequences of this approach, not only 
for national courts and authorities but for Strasbourg itself. 
 The Court’s approach as it has been outlined in section 3 is strongly inﬂ u-
enced by the special position of the ECtHR. In sections 1 and 4.1, we have 
already made reference to the Court’s supranational character and to the need 
for it to earn and continue to hold its speciﬁ c position in the European legal 
landscape. The Court must search, constantly, for a balance between, on the 
one hand, its subsidiary position vis-à-vis the member states and, on the other, 
its aim to interpret the Convention and provide effective protection to individu-
als. This is a difﬁ cult position, especially since the conﬁ dence of the member 
states in the Court matters a great deal to the effectiveness of the judgments of 
the Court. 76 In this context, the Court’s case-based approach is understandable 
indeed. The focus on the facts of the case placed before it allows the Court to 
take  “ incremental steps in speciﬁ c contexts rather than  . . . dramatic leaps in 
 75  See , on the case-based approach of the Court: Gerards,  supra note 1, at 9; Matscher,  supra note 10; 
Paul Mahoney,  Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two 
Sides of the Same Coin , 11 H UMAN R TS . L.J. 57, 77 (1990); Evert A. Alkema,  The European Convention as 
a Constitution and its Court as a Constitutional Court, in P ROTECTING H UMAN R IGHTS : T HE E UROPEAN 
P ERSPECTIVE 41, 59 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000). 
 76  Mahoney,  supra note 75, at 77 and section 4.1. 
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the dark. ” 77 This does not mean that the Court has no interest at all in adopting 
general conclusions or interpretations in individual cases; however, it appears 
reluctant to reach conclusions that expressly go beyond the case at hand. 78 
 The special position of the Court might also explain why the Court does not 
always respect the bifurcation between deﬁ nition and justiﬁ cation. Its current 
approach allows the Court to focus on the speciﬁ cs of each individual case and, 
as it were, to hide behind them. 79 Paying proper attention to the deﬁ nition 
stage might, in some cases, require the Court to make structural decisions, 
while these can be avoided or, at least, be left implicit by focusing on the indi-
vidual case. 80 The possibility of avoiding these choices allows the Court to take 
a modest position in the constitutional landscape and to maintain, carefully, 
the balance that has been described above. It enables the Court to take gradual 
steps and not to force itself upon all member states. 
 The downside to this approach is that it affects the semiconstitutional or guid-
ing function of the Court. National courts and authorities are frequently left in 
doubt about the precise scope and meaning of the Convention and often must 
give their own interpretation to the Convention provisions. After all, in current 
Court practice, frequently, the scope of rights is determined by taking into 
account elements that are highly case-speciﬁ c, which makes it more difﬁ cult to 
deduce general or abstract conclusions from the precise elements of the case. 
 The effect of this approach is not only that national authorities do not receive 
enough guidance; the approach of the Court also sets a bad example for judicial 
decision making on the level of the states. Unfortunately, inspiring the national 
authorities with its approach can also work against Strasbourg. Member states 
can use the same case-based approach to evade their Convention obligations. 
If the Court strongly focuses on the characteristics of the individual case, then 
national authorities can also focus on these characteristics to escape Convention 
obligations they do not want to abide by. This provides states with an excuse to 
say that the particular situations they are dealing with are to be distinguished 
from the case law of the Court and, in their view, do not fall within the scope of 
the Convention. Such a development might frustrate the implementation and 
effectiveness of the ECHR. In the end, and as a result, even more cases might 
ﬁ nd their way to Strasbourg, which would put still more pressure on the 
already overburdened Court. 
 The national authorities can be provided with more guidance if the Court 
pays more attention to the bifurcation. The deﬁ nition stage will then be sepa-
rated from the justiﬁ cation stage, which ensures that application to the facts of 
 77  Id. 
 78  On the willingness to draw general conclusions, see Gerards,  supra note 1, at 424 – 425. 
 79  Id. at 420. 
 80  Mahoney,  supra note 75, at 77 (explicitly conﬁ rming that the Court will avoid deciding some 
general issues if there is no need to decide them in the particular case). 
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the case will be concentrated in the second phase. Deﬁ ning the scope of the 
right on its own merits will provide national authorities with more indications 
as to how to interpret the Convention. More transparency in the choices made 
by Strasbourg could surely enhance the implementation of the Convention at 
national level. That would be beneﬁ cial both on an abstract level and — in the 
end — on the level of the individual applicant. If the understanding of the 
Convention is improved at national level this might have the result of fewer 
individuals ﬁ nding their way to Strasbourg. Indeed, the current number of 
applications and, particularly, the fact that about 60 percent of these applica-
tions are repetitive may be considered an indication that the national states are 
in need of more guidance from Strasbourg. 81 
 Would this change of approach upset the balance the Court is trying to 
maintain? Probably not, since the bifurcated approach would just divide the 
different roles of the Court between the different stages. In the deﬁ nition stage, 
the Court can guide member states on the proper interpretation of the 
Convention, while national differences and the subsidiary position could play 
a more prominent role at the justiﬁ cation stage. The emphasis on the bifurca-
tion would thus still enable the Court to maintain the balance. 
 4.3.  Consequences for the burden of proof 
 One of the most important arguments in favor of the bifurcation in fundamen-
tal rights cases is that it ensures a fair division of the burden of proof. 82 In the 
ﬁ rst or deﬁ nition stage, the applicant must demonstrate that the complaint 
concerns a fundamental right and that it actually comes within the scope of 
that right. 83 The applicant must take this ﬁ rst step in order to overcome the 
presumption of the validity of state action. 84 If the applicant succeeds, a prima 
facie case of an infringement of the Convention is established. 85 As a conse-
quence of this, the burden shifts to the government in the second or application 
stage; the state must then refute the assumption of a Convention violation by 
proving that the interference was justiﬁ ed. 86 
 Before going into the question of whether the organization of the burden of 
proof before the Strasbourg Court corresponds to this view, it is necessary to 
 81  Explanatory report to Protocol 14, CETS no. 194, 12 May 2004, § 7.  See also Alkema,  supra note 
75, at 60 (conﬁ rming that states are often in need of guidance from the Court). 
 82  See, e.g., Faigman,  supra note 55, at 1523 – 1524. 
 83  Id. at 1528. 
 84  Id. See also Tobias Thienel,  The Burden and Standard of Proof in the European Court of Human Rights , 
50 G ERMAN Y EARBOOK OF I NTERNATIONAL L AW 543, 553 – 54 (2008) and  see section 2 of this paper. 
 85  Ugur Erdal,  The Burden and Standard of Proof in Proceedings under the European Convention , 3 E UR . 
L. R EV . 68, 81 (2001). 
 86  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1523 – 1524; Erdal,  supra note 85, at 82; Thienel,  supra note 84, at 
553 – 554. 
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explain some theoretical notions that may help to understand the case law 
approach of the European Court. In the literature, a distinction is made between 
two concepts of the burden of proof. 87 The burden of proof is a term that is 
employed, generally, to refer to the burden of producing evidence. 88 It means 
that the party bearing this burden ﬁ rst must produce evidence supporting its 
claim. The second element of the burden of proof is regularly referred to as the 
burden of persuasion. 89 According to Tobias Thienel, this means that  “ if the fac-
tual contentions of the party bearing the burden of proof are not in the end proved 
to the appropriate standard, that party will lose on the relevant point. ” 90 In the 
view of Faigman this meaning of the burden of proof is used to  “ describe the allo-
cation of the responsibility of demonstrating issues of constitutional concern 
between the parties. ” 91 Rüdiger Wolfrum approaches both concepts differently 
and refers to two different stages in the burden of proof. 92 First, he states that the 
production phase is concerned with who should produce evidence. 93 The second 
phase is the assessment phase, in which the party bearing the burden of proof 
will lose if the court is not convinced that the assertions have been proven. 94 
Although the descriptions differ, the bottom line of all of these distinctions is the 
same; there is one element that deals with the burden of producing evidence, and 
another that deals with the consequences of failure to prove a certain claim. 
 In proceedings before the ECtHR, the burden of proof or the burden of producing 
evidence does not play a signiﬁ cant role in the sense that it is not placed strictly on 
either party. 95 An explanation for this may be found in the nature of the proceed-
ings before the Court. The complaints in Strasbourg always concern state action or 
the lack thereof. As a result, certain kinds of evidence might be impossible for an 
individual to obtain, because they are exclusively in the hands of the government. 96 
If the Court were to rely strongly on the burden of producing evidence this would 
weaken the position of the individual applicant. The Court, therefore, examines all 
 87  Thienel,  supra note 84, at 545; J ULIANE K OKOTT , T HE B URDEN OF P ROOF IN C OMPARATIVE AND I NTERNA-
TIONAL H UMAN R IGHTS L AW : C IVIL AND C OMMON L AW A PPROACHES WITH S PECIAL R EFERENCE TO THE A MERICAN 
AND G ERMAN L EGAL S YSTEMS 150 (1998). 
 88  Thienel,  supra note 84, at 545; Kokott,  supra note 87, at 150. 
 89  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1523; Kokott,  supra note 87, at 150; Thienel,  supra note 84, at 548. 
 90  Thienel,  supra note 84, at 548. 
 91  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1523. 
 92  Rüdiger Wolfrum,  The Taking and Assessment of Evidence by the European Court of Human Rights, in 
H UMAN R IGHTS , D EMOCRACY AND THE R ULE OF L AW 915, 918 (Stephan Breitenmoser ed., 2007). 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id . 
 95  Id. ;  see also Thienel,  supra note 84, at 546. 
 96  See, e.g., D.H. v. Czech Republic ( Grand Chamber ), 13 November 2007 § 179, appl. no. 57325/00, 
 http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
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material,  “ whether it originates from the Commission, the Parties or other sources, 
and, if necessary, obtains material  proprio motu . ” 97 
 The burden of persuasion, by contrast, does play an important role in 
Strasbourg proceedings. 98 It is not an issue on which the Court has expressed 
itself explicitly, 99 although it may be inferred from its case law that the respon-
sibility for failing to show the applicability of the Convention or a failure to 
show that an interference has occurred clearly lies with the applicant. 100 On 
the other hand, a failure to show that an interference is warranted by a  “ press-
ing social need ” is the responsibility of the respondent government. 101 It seems 
beyond doubt that the burden of persuasion lies with the applicant to show the 
applicability of the Convention. The burden of persuasion on the state seems to 
depend on the type of right concerned, or, in the words of Thienel, it  “ depends 
on the logical relationship of the human right at issue and the limitations pro-
vided for it in the Convention. ” 102 Within the range of cases pertaining to arti-
cles 8 through 11, the burden of persuasion is usually placed on the respondent 
state. 103 It is in the context of the division of the burden of persuasion — between 
applicant and respondent state — that the lack of respect for the bifurcation can 
have negative consequences. 
 The burden of persuasion is closely connected to the division between the 
ﬁ rst and second stages discussed in this paper. The presumption of the legality 
of state action results in the burden of persuasion being placed on the applicant 
in the ﬁ rst stage, which means that the applicant must prove that the provision 
is applicable and that there has been an interference. 104 In the second stage, in 
line with the text of provisions 8 through 11 in the Convention, the state is 
obliged to prove the justiﬁ cation for the interference. 
 97  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) § 160 (1978) (referred to by Thienel,  supra 
note 84, at 546 – 547 and Erdal,  supra note 85, at 81). 
 98  Wolfrum,  supra note 92, at 918; Thienel,  supra note 84, at 548;  see also Makhmudov v. Russia, 
26 July 2007 § 68, appl. no. 35082/04,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 99  The Court seems to pay more attention in its case law to the standard of proof in different types 
of cases, which is a related matter, but beyond the scope of this paper. The Court does, however, in 
certain types of cases address the issue of the burden of proof. For example in cases concerning ar-
ticles 2, 3, and the exhaustion of local remedies.  See, e.g., P IETER VAN D IJK ET AL ., T HEORY AND P RACTICE 
OF THE E UROPEAN C ONVENTION ON H UMAN R IGHTS 132, 355 (4th Ed. 2006). 
 100  See, e.g., Botta v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kyrtatos v. Greece ( dec. ), 2003-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.  Cf. 
Makhmudov v. Russia, 26 July 2007 § 68, appl. no. 35082/04,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 101  See, e.g., the recent case of Demir and Baykara v. Turkey ( Grand Chamber ), 12 November 2008, 
appl. no. 34503/97,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . The approach by Strasbourg is also acknowl-
edged in the literature.  See, e.g., Thienel,  supra note 84, at 551 and Erdal,  supra note 85, at 81 – 82. 
 102  Thienel,  supra note 84, at 552. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Faigman,  supra note 5, at 1528; Thienel,  supra note 84, at 553; Kokott,  supra note 87, at 40. 
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 In section 3, it has been shown that the Court often either ignores or insuf-
ﬁ ciently deals with the deﬁ nition stage or that it mixes the two stages. Due to 
the connection between the structure of Convention rights and the burden of 
persuasion, these approaches affect the latter as well. Without properly address-
ing both stages, the allocation of the burden of persuasion is muddled, and it 
becomes unclear who should bear this burden. This state of affairs also consti-
tutes a problem from the perspective of the guiding role of the Court. If the 
Court fails to respect the different adjudicative stages and, as a consequence, 
fails to provide guidance to the national courts on the allocation of the burden 
of persuasion, national courts are very much left on their own. The risk is that 
Strasbourg’s nebulous approach will be copied by national courts in their 
application of the Convention, which might result in undesirable confusion 
regarding the burden of persuasion at national level. 
 Another problematic consequence of an unclear burden of persuasion has 
been described by Faigman. 105 The crux of the problem is that when the divi-
sion of the burden of persuasion becomes unclear an unequal burden might be 
placed on the parties. According to Faigman, this is generally to the detriment 
of the individual applicant. Confusion of the two stages leads to confusion 
regarding the type of argument that plays a role in each phase. This could 
mean that governmental interests are taken into consideration when deﬁ ning 
the scope of the right. 106 Generally, the applicant is required to bear the burden 
of persuasion in showing the applicability of a fundamental right; however, 
this becomes an increasingly heavy, if not impossible, burden if governmental 
interests are incorporated in this stage. Instead of the government’s having to 
show that its interests justify an interference, the applicant must refute the 
public interest as a relevant argument for determining the scope of the provi-
sion. In the case law of the European Court, this risk is mainly visible in cases 
concerning positive obligations, where it is unclear in which phase the mean-
ing of the right is established. As a result, public interests in some cases play a 
role in deﬁ ning the scope of the rights in question. Consequently, applicants in 
individual cases might be held responsible for failing to show that a certain 
public interest does not render the provision inapplicable. This can be detri-
mental for the effective protection of individuals. 
 In cases concerning both negative and positive obligations, the preferable 
approach would be one in which, ﬁ rst, the deﬁ nition of the right is spelled out and, 
subsequently, the justiﬁ cation for the interference in the case is considered. The 
burden of persuasion would then be clearly divided. Such an approach would 
enhance the consistency in fundamental rights adjudication at both the Strasbourg 
and the national level and avoid detrimental consequences to the effectiveness of 
fundamental rights protection. In section 5, this solution will be explored further. 
 105  Faigman,  supra note 5. 
 106  Id. , at 1524. 
645Gerards and Senden  |  The structure of fundamental rights 
 4.4.  Consequences for the margin of appreciation doctrine 
 Like many national courts, the European Court of Human Rights usually 
shows a certain degree of deference toward the national authorities. It does so 
by leaving the national authorities a  “ margin of appreciation, ” which may be 
quite narrow or rather wide depending on the circumstances of the case. The 
primary justiﬁ cation that the Court has given for its margin of appreciation 
doctrine is that the national authorities, usually, are better placed than the 
European Court to assess the necessity of certain limitations of fundamental 
rights. 107 In addition, the doctrine enables the Court to pay respect to the pri-
macy of the national authorities in protecting fundamental rights. 108 Because 
of this rationale it is not surprising that the doctrine usually comes into play 
when the appropriateness and reasonableness of a justiﬁ cation are examined, 
or if the Court is asked to give an opinion about the proportionality of a certain 
national measure. 109 These standards all require some opinion to be given 
about national policy decisions and about the necessity and appropriateness of 
certain measures to pursue important public interests. 
 Given the Court’s subsidiary position it is reasonable that the Court goes to 
some lengths in respecting the national authorities ’ opinions as regards the 
justiﬁ ability of limitations. It would be rather strange, nonetheless, if the doc-
trine were applied to the deﬁ nitional stage of the Court’s review. 110 From the 
Convention provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Court it may be con-
cluded that the Strasbourg Court is entrusted with the ﬁ nal authority to inter-
pret the Convention. According to article 32 of the Convention, the jurisdiction 
of the Court extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Convention. It is contested whether this jurisdiction means that the 
 107  See, already, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 48 (1976); Ireland v. 
United Kingdom (IRA case), 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 207 (1978).  Cf .  e.g. Johan Callewaert,  Quel 
avenir pour la marge d’appreciation? ,  in P ROTECTING H UMAN R IGHTS : T HE E UROPEAN P ERSPECTIVE — S TUDIES IN 
M EMORY OF R OLV R YSSDAL , 147, 150 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000). 
 108  See, already, the so-called  Belgian Linguistics Case (Case  “ Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the 
use of language in education in Belgium ” v. Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968);  cf. Lord Mackay of 
Clashfern,  The margin of appreciation and the need for balance ,  in P ROTECTING H UMAN R IGHTS : T HE E UROPEAN 
P ERSPECTIVE 837, 840 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000); Paul Mahoney,  Marvellous Richness of Diversity or In-
vidious Cultural Relativism? , 19 H UM . R TS . L.J. 1, 2 (1998) and Sweeney,  supra note 30, at 472. 
 109  Cf. Jeroen Schokkenbroek,  The Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine 
in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights , 19 H UM . R TS . L.J. 30, 31 – 32 (1998) and  see 
R. St.J. Macdonald,  The Margin of Appreciation ,  in T HE E UROPEAN S YSTEM FOR THE P ROTECTION OF H UMAN 
R IGHTS 83, 123 (R. St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993) ( “ the margin of apprecia-
tion  . . . is more a principle of justiﬁ cation than interpretation ” ). Rather surprisingly, this element 
is hardly explored in legal scholarship about the margin of appreciation doctrine. Most legal com-
mentators seem to start from the view that the doctrine applies to the justiﬁ cation or limitation 
stage of the Court’s review, but this is seldom stated expressly. 
 110  Cf. S TEVEN G REER , T HE M ARGIN OF A PPRECIATION : I NTERPRETATION AND DISCRETION UNDER THE E UROPEAN 
C ONVENTION ON H UMAN R IGHTS 22 (Human Rights Files No. 17, 2000), Greer,  supra note 69, at 698 
and Callewaert,  supra note 107, at 163. 
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states have lost their power, fully, to deﬁ ne the scope and meaning of Convention 
rights to the European Court of Human Rights. 111 The Court itself has never 
clearly expressed itself on this sensitive issue. Nonetheless, it is rather obvious 
that it assumes it holds the ﬁ nal authority to explain the terms of the Convention 
and to determine the scope of its application. 112 
 This point is demonstrated, in particular, by the Court’s autonomous inter-
pretation of a variety of central Convention notions such as  “ civil rights and obli-
gations, ”  “ property, ” or  “ criminal charge. ” Although the Court has expressly 
adopted an autonomous interpretation only with respect to relatively clear, pro-
cedural notions, it has also provided uniform deﬁ nitions of such sensitive and 
substantive notions as  “ family life ” and  “ private life. ” 113 The Court has explained 
in a number of judgments that such autonomous and uniform deﬁ nitions are 
necessary to avoid the possibility that the protection offered by the Convention 
(along with the ability to have standing before the ECtHR) would come to depend 
on deﬁ nitions given to these notions by the forty-six states of the Council of 
Europe. 114 It would not be acceptable, for example, if social security claims were 
protected by the right to property in Sweden, and a Swedish victim could bring 
such a claim before the European Court, while the same kind of claims could be 
 111  See, e.g., Ostrovsky,  supra note 10, at 48 – 49 ( “ the doctrine of the margin of appreciation places 
the court as the secondary interpreter of these rights, after the Contracting State itself ” ). 
 112  This position of the Court also ﬁ nds support in the preamble to the Convention, which refers to 
the importance of a  “ common understanding and observance ” of the rights protected by the Con-
vention;  see Callewaert  supra note 107, at 154 and 163.  See also Tanja Goldman, Vo v. France  and 
Fetal Rights: The Decision Not To Decide , 18  Harv. Hum Rts. J. 277, 279 (2005). 
 113  See François Sudre,  Le recours aux  ‘ notions autonomes ’ ,  in L’ INTERPRÉTATION DE LA C ONVENTION EUROPÉENNE 
DES DROITS DE L ’ HOMME 93, 116 – 118 (François Sudre ed., 1998). Perhaps the best example of a uniform 
(albeit not  “ autonomous ” ) deﬁ nition of a sensitive notion is the case of  Pretty (Pretty v. United Kingdom 
( Grand Chamber ), 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R.), in which the Court explained that the notion of private life 
includes the right to personal autonomy and self-determination. Sudre has rightly stated that the 
Court would probably not classify this deﬁ nition as autonomous itself; in his opinion, the Court re-
serves the notion for  “ rule of law ” – related or procedural notions. However, the case of  Stec illustrates 
that this is not entirely true, since the Court there expressly gave an autonomous deﬁ nition of the 
notion of property in a case wholly unrelated to classic rule of law or procedural issues (Stec v. United 
Kingdom ( dec. ,  Grand Chamber ), 2005-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at § 49). The question as to when the Court 
expressly adopts an autonomous deﬁ nition in some cases and in other cases a uniform but not au-
tonomous deﬁ nition, therefore, remains something of an enigma. 
 114  See, e.g., Chassagnou v. France, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. § 100 ( “ If Contracting States were able, 
at their discretion, by classifying an association as  ‘ public ’ or  ‘ para-administrative, ’ to remove it 
from the scope of article 11, that would give them such latitude that it might lead to results incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the Convention, which is to protect rights that are not theo-
retical or illusory but practical and effective ” ).  See also Judge Martens in his dissenting opinion to the 
Cossey case (Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 3.6.3 (1990));  cf. R. Bernhardt, 
 Thoughts on the interpretation of human rights treaties ,  in T HE E UROPEAN S YSTEM FOR THE P ROTECTION OF 
H UMAN R IGHTS 65, 67 (R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993) and Sudre,  supra 
note 113, p. 94. 
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put completely outside the scope of the Convention and the Court’s jurisdiction 
as a result of a different deﬁ nition in Finland or Denmark. 115 
 On a more principled and fundamental level, it could also be argued that the 
rights enjoyed by the citizens of whatever country in the Council of Europe must 
be the same. 116 Of course, it is important to respect cultural diversity and varia-
tion, and it is not desirable to strive for complete uniformity in the protection of 
fundamental rights. 117 However, in order to avoid cultural relativism and to 
guarantee fundamental rights at a proper level, 118 it is advisable to take national 
differences in circumstances, tradition, and culture into account only when 
deciding about the justiﬁ cation of a concrete interference with a certain right. 119 
 All this would seem to imply that the Court should allow no margin of 
appreciation to the member states concerning the deﬁ nition of the terms of the 
Convention. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the European Court has applied, 
rather frequently, the doctrine at the deﬁ nitional stage, although this occurs 
only rarely in cases concerning negative interferences. 120 The foremost 
 115  See Stec v. United Kingdom ( dec. ,  Grand Chamber ), 2005-X Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 49 – 50 ( “ It is  . . . 
important to adopt an interpretation of article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which avoids inequalities of 
treatment based on distinctions which, at the present day, appear illogical or unsustainable ” ). 
 116  Cf. Sweeney,  supra note 30, at 460ff. and Ost,  supra note 38, at 305. 
 117  Cf. Mahoney,  supra note 109, at 3. 
 118  See, especially, Eyal Benvenisti,  Margin of appreciation, consensus, and universal standards , 31 
N.Y.U. J. I NT ’ L L. & P OL . 843, 844 (1998 – 1999);  see also Sweeney,  supra note 30, at 460 (speaking 
of the  “ tolerance trap ” in relation to the argument that local differences of opinion should be 
respected). 
 119  See Sweeney,  supra note 30, at 469 – 471 (explaining that the recognition of the universality of 
human rights should not be equated with uniformity:  “ even whilst maintaining  ‘ universal ’ hu-
man rights, there may be some defensible local qualiﬁ cation ” ). His argument seems to support the 
statement that uniformity or universality may reasonably be found on the level of the deﬁ nition of 
rights, since it is then stated in a rather general way that certain rights are to be protected through-
out the Council of Europe. It is also relatively easy to ﬁ nd agreement and consensus on such a 
general, abstract level, which makes it easier to provide uniform and autonomous deﬁ nitions. 
Such agreement is much more difﬁ cult to reach when the reasonableness of interferences is con-
cerned, since opinions may reasonably differ on the acceptability of certain reasons to justify the 
limitation of fundamental rights. To that extent, it seems reasonable to take account of local differ-
ences and variations only when scrutinizing the justiﬁ cation for an interference. 
 120  Cf. Schokkenbroek,  supra note 109, at 32, pointing out that the Court will leave a margin of 
appreciation when the Court must assess whether the term in question applies to the facts of the 
case or what requirements ﬂ ow from it. As an example he mentions the term  “ respect ” in article 8 
§ 1, which clearly pertains to the deﬁ nition of the right under discussion. Noticeably, however, he 
admits that a margin of appreciation is usually left in cases concerning positive obligations, in 
which the two stages of review are generally confused anyhow. It is, therefore, questionable 
whether the Court will really leave a margin of appreciation as regards the deﬁ nition of Conven-
tion terms outside this complex ﬁ eld of positive obligations. See also Sudre,  supra note 113, at 108, 
who even states that the Court never resorts to a margin of appreciation in determining the appli-
cability of the Convention. 
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 example of the recognition of a  “ deﬁ nitional margin of appreciation ” can be 
found in the notorious case of  Vo v. France , in which the Court ﬂ atly refused to 
give an autonomous deﬁ nition of the right to life. 121 The Court considered that 
there are so many different opinions within the Council of Europe that it would 
not be possible for it to rule in an authoritative manner on when the right to life 
begins. Instead, the Court left an interpretative margin of appreciation to the 
states, which means that they can now decide for themselves how the scope of 
the right to life should be deﬁ ned. The result is that the right to life of unborn 
children is protected in some states, and not in others. 122 
 However, even though this case is of great importance for the applicability 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine to the stage of rights deﬁ nition, it may be 
argued that it is a speciﬁ c and probably unique decision. 123 After all, the case 
concerned a right that is absolute in character, except for some highly speciﬁ c 
exemptions. As a result, the Court was confronted with a dilemma — if it had 
ruled that the right to life starts at birth, it would have offended national sensi-
bilities in quite a number of states, whereas it would have ruled out any possi-
bility of allowing abortion if it had said the right to life starts at conception. 124 
Because of the speciﬁ c nature of the right to life and the intense controversy 
surrounding the issue of abortion, this judgment may be considered an unrep-
resentative exception to the rule that no margin is given with respect to the 
deﬁ nition of fundamental rights. 
 Perhaps rather unexpectedly, however, the Court also frequently applies 
the margin of appreciation doctrine to the deﬁ nition of the scope of nonabso-
lute fundamental rights. Examples of this are relatively rare where negative 
interferences with fundamental rights are concerned; 125 however, they are 
abundant in cases concerned with positive obligations. In section 3, we have 
 121  Vo v. France ( Grand Chamber ), 2004-VIII E. Ct. H.R. See also the annotation by Jacco Bomhoff 
in E UROPEAN H UMAN R IGHTS C ASES 2004, no. 86 (showing that the Court normally does not recognize 
a margin of appreciation in deﬁ ning (interferences with negative) fundamental rights). Given the 
limitation of this paper to nonderogable rights (see the introduction), the case of  Vo is really out of 
place in this section but, since it is the only example of the express use of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, the case cannot be ignored. 
 122  It is clear from later cases decided by the Court that it is, indeed, unwilling to address any issues 
under article 2 that concern the right to life of unborn children;  see, e.g., Evans v. United Kingdom 
( Grand Chamber ), 10 April 2007, app. no. 6339/05,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
 123  Although article 2 contains a number of possibilities for limitation, these possibilities have been 
deﬁ ned very strictly. Apart from these very limited limitation clauses, the text of article 2 does not 
leave any room for justiﬁ cation. 
 124  However, it must be noted that various alternatives are feasible and have been advocated by 
both dissenting judges ( e.g. Judges Ress, Rozakis and Costa) and legal commentators ( see, e.g., 
Trees A. M. te Braake,  Does a Fetus have a Right to Life? The Case of Vo. v. France, 11  Eur. J. Health L. 
381, 387 (2004) and Goldman,  supra note 112, at 281). 
 125  But see Schokkenbroek,  supra note 109, at 32. 
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already discussed the case of  Hatton v. United Kingdom , concerning sleep distur-
bance caused by night ﬂ ights at Heathrow airport. 126 According to the appli-
cants, the national authorities had insufﬁ ciently investigated sleep disturbance 
by aircraft noise and had failed to set reasonable limits on nightly air trafﬁ c. It 
may be repeated, here, that the Court did not expressly ﬁ nd that article 8 was 
applicable to claims about sleep disturbance, restricting itself to stating that 
 “ Article 8  may apply in environmental cases . . . ” and that  “ [r]egard must be 
had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of 
the individual and the community as a whole. ” 127 Interestingly, the Court sub-
sequently left a margin of appreciation to the national authorities to deﬁ ne the 
positive obligations inherent to article 8: 
 Whilst the State is required to give due consideration to the particular 
interests the respect for which it is obliged to secure by virtue of Article 
8, it must in principle be left a choice between different ways and means 
of meeting this obligation, the Court’s supervisory function being of a 
subsidiary nature and thus limited to reviewing whether or not the par-
ticular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance. 128 
 In addition, the Court stated that the scope of the margin of appreciation 
could be determined only by reference to the context of the particular case. 129 
The Court then tested whether the national authorities had struck a reasona-
ble balance between the individual and governmental interests concerned. In 
the end, it did not ﬁ nd that  “ [i]n substance, the authorities overstepped their 
margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of 
the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and 
home, and the conﬂ icting interests of others and of the community as a 
whole. ” 130 The quoted considerations show that the Court wanted to restrict 
itself to reviewing the  “ fairness ” of the balance of interests struck by the 
national government. Although a large part of the judgment is devoted to 
determining the exact scope of the margin that should be given to the states, 
the Court did not reach a conclusive judgment on the issue. However, the gen-
eral result of the Court’s approach was that the national authorities were actu-
ally given much latitude in determining the scope and meaning of article 8. 
 Admittedly, it is fully reasonable that the national authorities should be left 
with a substantial margin of appreciation in determining the need for meas-
ures against sleep disturbance, especially since important economic interests 
 126  Hatton v. United Kingdom ( Grand Chamber ), 2003-VIII E. Ct. H.R. 
 127  § 98, emphasis added. 
 128  § 123. 
 129  § 104. 
 130  § 129. 
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were involved, and the case concerned difﬁ cult issues of social and planning 
policy. Indeed, the margin of appreciation doctrine is designed precisely to deal 
with this type of situation. It may be argued, however, that allowing a broad 
margin of appreciation is reasonable only at the stage of  justiﬁ cation , not at the 
stage of  deﬁ ning the rights protected by the Convention. 131 The ECtHR has never 
given any sound reason why it would consider the national authorities to be 
 “ better placed ” than itself in deﬁ ning the scope of fundamental rights, or why 
there is no need for autonomous deﬁ nitions in the sphere of positive obliga-
tions. Furthermore, it is far from clear at what point the Court deems the 
national authorities competent to give an interpretation to the Convention by 
means of a balancing of interests (which will only be marginally reviewed by 
the Court) and when it will take over and establish its own autonomous and 
uniform interpretation. For national courts that have to apply Convention 
rights, the case law about the margin of appreciation and autonomous inter-
pretation of the Convention may be incomprehensible indeed. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court seems inclined to allow a 
considerable margin of appreciation in almost every case concerning positive 
obligations, regardless of the importance of the individual right at stake. In 
cases that deal with negative obligations, the Court ﬁ rst deﬁ nes the individual 
right that has been interfered with (although, as demonstrated in section 3, it 
often pays little attention to the deﬁ nition), and only then will it consider the 
justiﬁ cation. The intensity of the Court’s scrutiny of the justiﬁ cation will be in 
line with the margin of appreciation that is left to the state. The margin of 
appreciation itself is determined by a number of factors, one of which is the 
nature of the affected individual right. 132 This is clearly apparent in article 10 
cases, in which the Court considers it relevant to the margin of appreciation 
that a core aspect of the right has been limited (such as freedom of the press). 133 
In such cases, stricter scrutiny will be applied than if only the periphery of the 
right has been affected (as in cases about commercial speech). 134 This means 
 131  Cf. (rather implicitly) Greer  supra note 69, at 698. 
 132  Cf., e.g., Buckley v. United Kingdom, 1996-IV E. Ct. H.R. § 75:  “ The scope of this margin of 
 appreciation is not identical in each case but will vary according to the context. Relevant factors 
include the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the  nature 
of the activities concerned. ”  See also J ANNEKE G ERARDS , J UDICIAL R EVIEW IN E QUAL T REATMENT C ASES 187ff. 
(2005).  Cf. Thomas A. O’Donnell,  The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights , 4 H UM . R TS . Q. 474, 492 – 493 (1982), Schokkenbroek,  supra 
note 109, at 35 and Søren C. Prebensen,  The Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the 
Convention , 19 H UMAN R TS . L.J. 13, 17 (1998). 
 133  See, e.g., Autronic AG v. Switzerland, 178 E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 61 (1990):  “ Where  . . . there has 
been an interference with the exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in paragraph 1 of 
Article 10, the supervision must be strict, because of the importance of the rights in question . . . . ” 
 134  See, e.g., Markt Intern Verlag v. Germany, 165 E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) and Wabl v. Austria, 
21 March 2000, app. no. 24773/94,  http :// www . echr . coe . int / eng . 
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that the deﬁ nition of the right is, normally, considered to be of value to the 
scope of the margin of appreciation and the intensity of the Court’s justiﬁ cation 
test. It is, therefore, rather curious that, in many cases about positive obliga-
tions, the individual right is not at all deﬁ ned. The meaning of the Convention 
rights in these cases seems to depend on the reasonableness of the balance 
struck at the national level between the various interests, a balance that is itself 
scrutinized often rather marginally. 135 Exactly how the margin of appreciation 
is determined in these cases is unclear; 136 regardless, it will be quite difﬁ cult to 
take the importance of the individual right into account if no such right is deﬁ ned 
in the ﬁ rst place. This is all the more problematic since the importance of the 
individual right concerned might invite the application of a stricter test, which 
means that the national balancing of interests will be examined more critically. 
It is not improbable that, at least in some cases, a different outcome would be 
reached if the individual right concerned were expressly recognized and deﬁ ned 
as a ﬁ rst step. 137 The Court’s confusion between the ﬁ rst and second stage of 
fundamental rights review thus hampers a sound application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and, consequently, may result in judicial review that is not 
sufﬁ ciently strict. 
 135  See also François Sudre,  Les  “ obligations positives ” dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de 
l’homme [ “ Positive obligations ” in European human rights jurisprudence] ,  in P ROTECTING H UMAN R IGHTS : 
T HE E UROPEAN P ERSPECTIVE — S TUDIES IN M EMORY OF R OLV R YSSDAL 1359, 1373 (Paul Mahoney ed., 2000) 
(stating that, in general, the test applied in cases about positive obligations is a general balancing 
test that is generally not very strict, that is somewhat rashly applied, and that is much more vague 
than the test applied to negative obligations). 
 136  In fact, it is often noticed that (generally) the margin of appreciation allowed in cases about posi-
tive obligations is rather broad — see, e.g., Sudre,  supra note 135, at 1369 (although this is debated, 
 see, e.g., Clare Ovey,  The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention , 19 H UM . R TS . L.J. 10 
(1998)). Interestingly, the example of  Hatton makes clear that the Court is well aware of the problem; 
in this case, the Court did pay attention to the individual interests concerned in determining its mar-
gin of appreciation. Unfortunately, in the end it did not provide any clarity as regards the ambit of the 
margin of appreciation, since it considered that the margin was closely linked to the facts of the case 
at hand ( Hatton , §§ 103 – 104). This is a general problem regarding the margin of appreciation doc-
trine; it occurs altogether too often that the Court leaves the question as to the scope of the margin 
undecided ( cf. G ERARDS ,  supra note 132, at 196). We will leave this issue aside in our paper since the 
problem is not closely related to the Court’s structural confusion. 
 137  Cf. the dissenting opinion of (former) Judge Martens in  Cossey , in which he also makes clear that 
it may make a difference to the structure of the Court’s review and to the application of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine whether the case is framed as a case concerning positive obligations or as 
a case concerning a negative interference (Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1990). In most cases it is rather easy to deﬁ ne the case in both ways ( cf . Sudre,  supra note 35 at 
1362). This means that the same claim might invite a stricter test if deﬁ ned as a negative interfer-
ence than if deﬁ ned as a failure to respect positive obligations. It is clear that there is no logical or 
reasonable explanation to be given for such a difference in approach. See also the dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Wildhaber in Stjerna v. Finland, 299-B E. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) and see, critically, 
Sudre,  supra note 135, at 1374. 
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 5.  Conclusion 
 The foregoing sections have made clear that it is important to distinguish 
clearly between the deﬁ nition of the scope of fundamental rights and the test of 
justiﬁ cation. Furthermore, it appears that, from this perspective, the approach 
followed by the European Court of Human Rights falls short. In many cases, 
the Court either skips the ﬁ rst stage or pays scarce attention to the deﬁ nition of 
the right at issue. In other cases, the Court confuses or merges the ﬁ rst and 
second stages of review, thus blurring the line between deﬁ nition and justiﬁ ca-
tion. It has been argued in this paper that this approach causes serious prob-
lems from the perspective of the clarity of the Court’s case law, the division of 
the burden of proof in (national) fundamental rights cases, and the application 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
 Much would be gained if the Court took more seriously the bifurcated 
approach toward fundamental rights. The clarity and insightfulness of the 
Court’s case law could be much improved if — taking a more structural 
approach — it articulated its reasoning in two argumentative stages, paying 
closer attention to each. In the ﬁ rst stage, the Court could refer systematically 
to classic methods of interpretation in order to determine whether the 
Convention applies to the individual complaint at hand. In light of the Court’s 
quasi-constitutional role, it is not sufﬁ cient merely to state that both parties 
agree that the Convention is applicable or to conclude that it  “ evidently ” 
applies. Even in cases that do not raise any new deﬁ nitional questions, the 
Court should refer to earlier cases in which the issue of scope was decided. In 
cases raising new deﬁ nitional issues, the Court should reason in a convincing 
manner as to why the claim does (or does not) come within the scope of the 
Convention, for example, by seeking analogies to earlier cases, by referring to 
the text and aims of the Convention, or by using other classical methods of 
interpretation. 
 In cases concerning positive obligations, additionally, the Court could take 
the deﬁ nition of the scope of the right at hand more seriously. 138 In the  Hatton 
case discussed in sections 3 and 4.4, which concerned the state’s alleged fail-
ure to protect the people living in the neighborhood of Heathrow against air-
craft noise, it is possible, for example, to reason that the right to respect for 
one’s private life also covers the right to peaceful and undisturbed sleep, hav-
ing regard to the underlying values of the Convention and to earlier cases in 
which similar claims have been considered. If the scope of the right has been 
deﬁ ned in this manner, the next step is to examine if it was reasonable for the 
government to interfere with this right by deciding to maintain certain noise 
 138  See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Wildhaber in Stjerna v. Finland, 299-B E. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1994).  Cf. also Van Dijk,  supra note 33, at 25, although he suggests a different solution in 
which there is less of a place for the concept of positive obligations as such. 
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levels and to conduct only a limited amount of research into sleep disturbance 
patterns. 139 Thus, the question to be answered at this stage is whether due 
respect for the established Convention right would have demanded a certain 
action from the authorities. In deciding this, the Court could allow a margin of 
appreciation to the national authorities in order to accommodate their particu-
lar needs and abilities in evaluating facts and making policy choices. 
 Such a two-stage approach, which should also be applied by the national 
courts, would enhance the quality of both national and transnational or supra-
national argumentation in fundamental rights cases. It would provide clarity 
about the respective roles of national and supranational courts regarding both 
the way in which fundamental rights should be applied by the courts and the 
division of the burden of proof. In the complex world of human rights law that 
would be beneﬁ cial to all parties concerned. 
 139  Cf. Sudre,  supra note 135, at 1374, who explains that it would be desirable to use the term  “ in-
terference ” not only in the negative sense ( i.e., to describe an active interference with a right) but 
also in a positive sense ( i.e., to describe inaction by the state that allegedly results in a lack of pro-
tection of a fundamental right). Sudre refers to  “ normalisation méthodique ensuite: pour toute 
ingérence, qu’elle que soit active où passive, la Cour devrait rechercher si les conditions ﬁ gurant 
dans la clause d’ordre public (base légale, but légitime, nécessité) sont remplies [standardization of 
methodology so that, for any interference — be it active or passive, the Court should ascertain 
whether the conditions contained in the law and order clause (legal foundation, legitimate aim, 
necessity) have been met]. ” 
